In Knoxville Major General John Cocke was under orders to muster a division of 2500 East Tennessee volunteer militia. Arriving there on September 23, 1813, John Thorlton was mustered into Colonel Samuel Wear's 1st Regiment of Mounted Gunmen, Tennessee Volunteer Militia commanded by Brigadier General James White, and elected Sergeant. His company commander was Captain John Chiles. John Thorlton like his peers, and according the law of the day, was to serve a three-month enlistment, a fact that was to become a major dispute between General Jackson and his command of West Tennessee Volunteers. John Thorlton's pay was eleven dollars per month.

Captain John Chiles was born in neighboring Virginia. Little more is written of this man.

Colonel Samuel Wear, one of the first settlers in East Tennessee, was born in Rockbridge County, Virginia on February 26, 1753. He married an Irish immigrant named Mary Thompson on November 2, 1779, at Rockbridge County, Virginia and they settled on Pigeon River, near Sevierville, Tennessee, and near here built Wear's Fort. Mary Wear died in March of 1797. He served in several units during the Revolution, and was active in the forming of the State of Franklin. When statehood was achieved, he was one of the signers of the state's Constitution. He died on his plantation near Sevierville Tennessee April 3, 1817.

Brigadier General James White, the subordinate commander to Major General John Cocke, was 67 years of age and 25 years senior to Cocke and 20 years senior to Old Hickory himself. General White was born in Rowan County, North Carolina in 1747, to Scotch Irish parents. During the Revolution he served as a Captain of the Militia. In 1783 he was given land in the Tennessee area, by the State, as a reward for his service during the war. He moved his family to the French Broad river area, near Fort Chiswell. In 1786 he moved to the present site of Knoxville where he built White's Fort (later Knoxville). In 1792, two years after John Thorlton Sr. arrived in the Territory, James White began to lay out the Town of Knoxville. In 1796 he served in the convention that drew up the new states constitution. He formed a life long friendship with John Sevier and William Blount. White died in his town of Knoxville in 1821.

Major General John H. Cocke was born in Brunswick, Nottaway County, Virginia in 1772, the son of William and Mary Mclin Cocke. The family came from Virginia around 1780, and settled in Mulberry Grove, Hawkins County, Tennessee. His father William Cocke was, along with Governor William Blount, the first two senators to the United States Congress from Tennessee. William Cocke, born in Amelia County, Virginia in 1748, was the son of Abraham Cocke, and descendant of Richard Cocke who came to Virginia around 1628. He was a Captain in the Militia during the Revolution. He followed Daniel Boone into Kentucky in 1778, bringing his family, and his six-year-old son John. He had been a noted Indian fighter in early Tennessee history. Later admitted to the bar, he was instrumental in the attempt at forming the State of Franklin. When it failed, he was then appointed to a Judgeship, and then a Senator. Judge Cocke's son John was at the age of twenty-one, a member of the Tennessee legislature. On October 19, 1793, along with Samuel Wear from Washington County, and his long time friend James White from Sumner County, John Cocke was appointed assemblyman from Hawkins County. One year later James White became representative to the Congress from Davidson County. In March of 1796, Representative James White became the new Senator from Knox County and John Cocke became Hawkins County Representative to Congress. John's father William was re-elected a Senator, along with William Blount. That same year 21 year old John Cocke and his future distracter 29 year old Andrew Jackson were enrolled to practice law in the state of Tennessee, one year later Jackson would become a Senator to the Congress. In 1809 William Cocke was defeated by William Blount for Governor of Tennessee, and was appointed circuit Judge for which he was ill suited, and was later impeached. While his son John was fighting the Creek War with the rank of Major General, William Cocke accepted the rank of a private and, the old Indian fighter fought with great bravery even though he was now over 65 years old. John Cocke died in Tennessee in 1854.

When Governor Blount called for 2, 500 troops from East Tennessee, John Cocke had just finished serving as speaker of the state house of Representatives, and was appointed a Major General of the East Tennessee Militia, with a date of rank slightly less than that of Jackson. He was given command of the East Tennessee Division.

The rivalry that began with the dividing of the state militia into East and West factions once again came to fore. There would be two separate fighting forces, the west under General Andrew Jackson and the east under General John Cocke. Under orders from Governor Blount, each was to be independent of the other when serving in different regions, but if united then Jackson as senior would take overall command.

The East Tennesseans and General Cocke in particular were destined to be the scapegoats for General Jackson ill conceived, poorly executed, embarrassing calamities of the following three month venture into the Mississippi Territory.

In most narratives of the Creek War General John Cocke, a man of honor and distinction, is depicted of first, as neglecting his duty and second, as frustrating General Jackson's plans. He was later court-martialed, and found innocent of all charges, although he was convicted in the eyes of his countrymen, a wholly undeserved verdict.

General Cocke's misfortunes began in a meeting between him, Governor Blount and General Jackson at the beginning of the Creek War. At this meeting General Cocke stated in his narrative that;

"General Jackson and myself were both in Nashville when intelligence reached that place of the Massacre of Fort Mims. (this meeting took place about September 11, Jackson's fight with the Bentons took place on September 4, five days after the Mims massacre) This intelligence caused the deepest excitement of the public mind. Governor Blount ordered me forthwith to repair to my division and raise twenty-five hundred men, and join the Georgia troops with utmost dispatch. At this instance I accompanied him to the room of General Jackson, who was then confined in consequence of wounds received in his bloody tragedy with Thomas H. and Jesse Benton. The Governor informed him of the order he had given me, and his purpose of making and order upon him for a like number of men from his division, if he thought he would be able to take command. General Jackson informed the Governor that his wounds were improving, and that he thought he would be able to take the command by the time the troops could be raised. General Jackson then asked me if sufficient supplies could be raised in East Tennessee for both commands. I replied that I thought there could be. He then told me he would take it as a great favor if I would make a requisition on McGhee, the contractor at Knoxville, for supplies for his army, I promised to do so, and he gave me a statement as to the amount required. At the request of Governor Blount, I remained at Nashville a few days, until the legislature met and made and appropriation of $200,000 to furnish supplies for the troops ordered into service. That amount was subject to the order of General Jackson and not one dollar of whichever came to my hands or under my control, I immediately repaired to my division, and upon my arrival at Knoxville I saw McGhee, the contractor, and made requisition for supplies for my own command, and also for that of General Jackson, as I had promised him to do. I was informed by the contractor that he would have no difficulty in procuring the supplies according to the requisition, but that he had no means of transporting them unless there should be a rise in the river. (the river in East Tennessee at that time was to low to traverse, but to the west in the territory under Jackson's control, the height of the river was up and traffic was able to travel on the river).

General Cocke then continued:

"I had no difficulty in raising the number of troops required. About the 1st of October I rendezvoused my troops at Knoxville, and they mustered into service, and on the twelfth day after I took up the line of march I encamped with my command on the banks of the Coosa, which was the dividing line between the Cherokee and Creek Indians, where I was compelled to halt for want of supplies from the contractor, but owing to the low water they did not arrive, and I was compelled to procure supplies from the Cherokees as best I could."

Under orders from Governor Blount, the East Tennessee troops were to enter the Indian Territory from the west and unite with the Georgia troops. A fact that General Jackson fully acknowledged as mentioned in his letter to Colonel Coffee from the Heritage dated September 29, 1813;

".......Should you find that they (the Creeks) are not moving from the Nation with their families, but are contemplating an attack in conjunction with the Spaniards on Mobile . . . you will immediately notify me by express, and give me the information whether the force in that quarter is sufficient to check with yours united, and whether from that point an attack upon the Nation would not be as favorable to success as from Dittos landing. I shall expect all my Industry to save Mobile, leaving General Cocke's Division to cooperate with the Georgians and enter the Nation by way of Coosa River."

And a letter from Governor Blount to General Jackson dated October 4, 1813 making reference to a letter the Governor had written to Governor David B. Mitchell of Georgia the same date in which he informed Mitchell that Jackson and Cocke;

"........are now in service of the Government, and that they, each, commanded a detachment of two thousand five hundred men, ordered into service to act separately against the hostile Creek Indians, or in concert with the Troops ordered from the State of Georgia by Government for the same purpose, together with such regular troops as may be ordered to co-operate with them, as knowledge of circumstances may teach the propriety of . . . "

In Blount's letter to Jackson the Governor said in part;

"......also my letter of this date to the Government of Georgia, or the officers commanding the Troops in service from that State, destined to act against the hostile Creek Indians, you will please transmit those letters according to address, keeping yourself a copy of each, and also cause a copy of the latter to be forwarded to Major General Cocke, and also send the General a copy of this and say to him, that he will please consider it as addressed to him from his government . . . making necessary arrangements for concert with Major General Cocke . . . "

It is made plain that both armies were to act as separate units and that Jackson was not, as he thought in command of General Cocke, but was to act in concert with him. What seems evident as the events progress was that General Jackson was far more concerned with the image projected to the people, of himself and his command, than that of East Tennesseans. And whenever a difficulty arose he found a way to shift the spotlight from himself to someone else, or some unit from East Tennessee.

Still recuperating from a gun shot wound received in a street brawl with Jesse and Thomas Hart Benton, (later Senator Benton from Missouri) General Jackson left his sick bed to assume command of his troops of West Tennessee, and later that of friendly Choctaw Indian militia formed in the Mississippi Territory. General Jackson was still too weak to travel. But fearing that the opportunity that had presented itself to him, of promised military glory, would not long wait. He gathered himself from his sick bed and after giving assignments, the west Tennessee troops were ordered to rendezvous at Fayetteville Tennessee on October 4.

General Jackson's friend, Colonel Coffee led 1,000 West Tennesseans south to Huntsville, in the Mississippi Territory, as per his commander's orders. By the time Colonel Coffee reached his destination on October 4, he had been joined by an additional 300 men bringing his force to 1300. Meanwhile General Jackson still weak, but unwilling to wait reached Fayetteville on the 7th of October where he waited for the remainder of his troops.

The fear in Jackson's mind that the Creeks might follow their victory at Fort Mims with a strike at Mobile, proved unwarranted. However while in Fayetteville he received a dispatch that Colonel Coffee was in eminent danger of attack by nearby Creeks. The General gave orders to prepare for an immediate departure. They left Fayetteville the morning of Monday, October 11, and after a forced marched arrived at Huntsville some 32 miles away at eight o'clock that evening. The following morning Jackson learned that the rumors, of an impending attack on Coffee, were false, so he crossed the Tennessee River at Dittos Landing and joined forces with Colonel Coffee, bringing the total army of West Tennessee to 2500 men, 1300 horses, but very few provisions.

Both armies, Cocke's East Tennessee Division, and Jackson's West Tennessee Division, small as they were, each required ten wagon loads of supplies a day. A week's provision consisted of 1,000 bushels of grain, 20 tons of meat, 1,000 gallons of whiskey, plus many other various items. With the river to the north still to low to travel on, a fact unknown to Jackson, supplies had not yet left Tennessee.

Sergeant John Thorlton and his men crossed the Tennessee border, at the present town of Chattanooga, into the Mississippi Territory and was now just south of Lookout Mountain. On the 15th of October Sergeant John Thorlton under the command of General White, arrived with his fellow East Tennesseans, on the banks of the Coosa River. Now 40 miles farther south than Coffee's troops, the men were in a near starving condition when they joined General Cocke's command. Weak and hungry, the East Tennesseans mustered the strength to build Fort Armstrong. At this point the two armies really did not know the location of the other. The only communication was a letter to General Jackson from Pathkiller, a friendly Creek Indian, dated October 22, in which he made mention of some of his warriors joining up with General White's advance detachment, and that the general might be on his way. Based on this information General Jackson wrote to General Flournoy of Georgia on October 24, from Fort Deposit;

"After having encountered every difficulty that can possibly arise from the want of supplies, and from the ruggedness of mountains, I have at length reached this place. Here I established a Depot for the reception of such supplies as may be sent me, either up or down the river and shall leave a sufficient number of men to guard it . . . The East Tennessee troops have not yet joined me; but I expect a junction to be formed with me in a few days by General White who commands the advance Division."

Jackson's reference to General White joining him, was an unusual remark considering the fact that Jackson was aware the units were to act separately, also the troops of East Tennessee on that date were already 20 miles farther south than Jackson's forces and across a range of mountains. In order to join him they would have had to retreat 20 miles. General Jackson, also sorely in need of provisions, sent his Quartermaster, Major W. B. Lewis back to Nashville, to procure provisions, and Colonel Coffee into the nearby country to forage for whatever food might be available. On October 19, a friendly Creek Chief brought news of a group of Hostile Creeks about to attack a fort filled with friendly Indians at a place named Ten Islands on the Coosa River, some 70 miles east of General Jackson's position. The General immediately broke camp and started south to fortify that position, but no message of his movements was dispatched to General Cocke. Traveling along the Tennessee River, Jackson arrived at Thompsons Creek where he built a supply depot which he named Fort Deposit. On the evening of October 24, he continued his fifty-mile journey south to Ten Islands. Possessing only two days supply of bread and six days of meat, Jackson was apprehensive, for he now knew the contractors had completely failed in meeting their quotas, the foragers had experienced some success, by gathering 300 hundred bushels of corn, which Colonel Coffee had taken from an Indian village at Black Warrior River. Another of Jackson's colonel's had taken a village at Littafulchee, where they confiscated a goodly supply of corn. With this supply of food the army marched on till they arrived at their destination on the Coosa River, some 50 miles southwest of General Cocke's outpost of Fort Armstrong. Here near Canoe Creek and the Coosa River Jackson began another fort which he named Fort Strother. Still both armies were operating as separate units with little if any communication between them. Meanwhile thirty miles away, Lashley's Fort at Talladega was under siege by 1,000 Creek warriors. The people of the fort had little food or provisions. General Jackson again made preparations for still a deeper march into the wilderness. While preparing for his departure, Jackson learned that an advance guard of General Cocke's East Tennesseans, of which John Thorlton was part and under the command of General White, was nearing Fort Strother. General Jackson left a letter, addressed to General White, in which he stated White and his men should remain at Fort Strother and protect it and its inhabitants. He then forded the Coosa River to the east bank and marched south to the defense of Fort Lashley.

At sunset he arrived within six miles of Talladega and Lashley's Fort, and ordered his men to rest for the morning battle. About midnight an Indian runner brought a dispatch from General White dated November 7, 1813 from Turkey Town 15 miles from Fort Strother. In it General White wrote;

"I was on march to meet you at the a Ten Islands when I received a positive order from Major General Cocke to alter my route and form a junction with him near the mouth of Chatuga, which I have done. "

Here began the trouble between the two commands of Jackson and Cocke. These troubles where due mostly to the hasty preparations before leaving Tennessee, unclear chain of command, and the poor communications between the two armies. There was also the old jealousy, and competition between the soldiers of east and west Tennessee.

Though General Jackson was senior and thereby considered himself overall commander, General Cocke was from the beginning, separated by many miles, with no established means of communication, and no way of knowing Jackson's desires or plans. All the while General Cocke operated under orders to act as a separate command, until, if and when a junction was made with General Jackson.

General Cocke knew that General Jackson's need of supplies was as desperate as his own. With the lack of communication General Cocke pondered his next move. He realized it was necessary to the success of the campaign that better communications be instigated and that the two armies should act in concert as originally instructed by Governor Blount. And it was this mutual concern of both commanders that was mentioned in a letter to General Cocke from General Jackson dated November 16, from Fort Strother;

"I have received your letter by Judge White (General Whites son) and perfectly agree with you in opinion that it essential to the success of the campaign the two forces from Tennessee should act in concert . . . "

While considering the propriety of the joining of the two armies, the question of supplies came to his mind and he reasoned, with famine facing his troops, what would be the result of combining the armies and creating 5,000 hungry soldiers in the wilderness? He had recently conferred with Colonel Cowan, who had been in the area for more than six weeks. Colonel Cowan advised General Cocke that his army would be destroyed by famine if he continued in pursuit of Jackson. With so many lives at stake he decided on an officer's council, and to let a vote decide.

He asked his officers,

"Shall we follow Jackson?"

The answer was unanimously,

"no!"

He then asked,

"Shall we cross the Coosa River to attack the Indian villages on the Tallapoosa River, farther to the south?

The answer here was unanimously,

"yes!"

It was at this time that General Cocke sent the order, mentioned earlier, to General White at his camp in Turkey Town, for he knew nothing of the conditions at Fort Strother, nor the order left by Jackson. Cocke ordered White and his men to return to his main body at Fort Armstrong. Cocke now felt, that if they followed Jackson they would not have supplies enough, and victory was far from sure. So they decided to take a path he felt would provide a better chance of victory. When General White received the order from General Cocke to return, he was faced with the dilemma, whose order to follow, the order left in the note by General Jackson, or the note with the order from his commander, General Cocke. He concluded that his obedience was due to his immediate superior, General Cocke, the Major General of the division to which his brigade was attached. General White then sent General Jackson the dispatch which caused Jackson so much astonishment and alarm.

General Jackson's victory completed at Talladega, he returned to Fort Strother to find no provisions, and the fort in a desperate state. An event was about to take place that further exasperated the developing situation. Many of the Indians who had fought Jackson at Talladega were from the Hillabee towns along the Tallapoosa River. These Indians realizing their continued hostilities would be of no use, decided to seek peace negotiations with General Jackson. The emissary from the Hillabee Indians was named Robert Grierson.

With the return of General White, General Cocke's command was now intact, and seventy miles from communication with General Jackson.

Cocke continued with his narrative:

"A short time after I received reliable intelligence that the famous Bill Scott, who commanded the Creeks at the Battle of Talladega, was at the nearby Hillabee towns, about one hundred miles from his camp, and that as soon as he recovered from his wounds it was his purpose to put to death every white man and friendly Indian in the nation. I immediately dispatched General White with the mounted troops and Cherokees who had attached themselves to my command, with only three days ration, which was all we could spare, to attack the towns."

Here on November 18, the very day the Indian envoy, Grierson, left Jackson's camp, General White and his command which included, Sergeant John Thorlton under the command of Colonel Wears, and the rest of Wears 1st Regiment of East Tennessee Mounted Volunteer Militia, attacked. The force performed its duty but to well.

General White was totally unaware of what had transpired between General Jackson and Grierson. As far as White and his command were concrened, these Indians were hostile, so the men completed their mission. Sergeant Thorlton and his men under the command of Colonel Wears, burned a total of 123 houses, killed sixty warriors, and captured two hundred, along with fifty women and children. The troops believing they had performed the duty for which they had volunteered, returned to General Cocke's main body, and received a hero's welcome from the entire command. From the prospective of the East Tennesseans this was as great a victory as Colonel Coffee's at Talladega for which General Jackson wrote to Governor Blount that Fort Mims had been avenged. The only difference being the conference between Jackson and Grierson, of which the East Tennesseans were unaware. I wonder what the result would have been had the tables been turned, and General White had attacked first and Grierson had sought terms from General Cocke with General Jackson unaware of the proceedings, then attacked Talladega.

Meanwhile after receiving Jackson's terms, Grierson returned to the Hillabee people to find that while he was away the town had been destroyed. The Hillabee tribe was furious. This then is General Jackson's answer, they thought. It renewed a fury in the Indians that lasted till the end of the war.

General Cocke believing his men had performed a good and heroic work wrote General Jackson from Fort Armstrong on November 27, two weeks after Jackson received the letter from Grierson seeking terms, General Jackson had not yet communicated this fact to General Cocke, and so General Cocke was still unaware of any peace negotiations;

John Reid a personal friend of Andrew Jackson began a biography of his friend but died before it was completed. John Eaton, another friend and confident of Jackson, completed the work. It has been used by many biographers, and historians as a reference source, and inaugurated many of the tails of folklore, and half truths that surround Andrew Jackson. John Eaton later served on President Jackson's Cabinet, but his wife was not accepted in Washington society, causing a scandal that eventually forced Eaton to resign. Eaton's, "Jackson Biography," was slanted in the General's favor on most controversial subjects, from the dueling scandals of Jackson to the Creek war. General Cocke was treated quite unfavorably by Eaton, and the East Tennessee involvement in the Creeks war was either scandalized or totally ignored.

On December 16, 1818, General John Cocke published a letter which today resides in the rare book section of the Library of Congress. In it John Cocke answers Eaton's charges. The complete letter is printed in the appendix of this book. Below is an excerpt referring to the attack on the Hillabee Town, and making reference to the fact that perhaps the peace negotiations were lacking in sincerity;

"............ I could wish you had pointed out the advantages likely to be obtained by uniting two starving armies; the information would have been important. General Jackson's complaints were for supplies, he already had more men than he could support. Would not a union have been more distressing? Had I been apprised of the Generals prospect of battle, I would have aided as far as possible, and would have been delighted to have relived his necessities, but on whom did he call? On me, who was as destitute as himself. Every exertion was made to procure supplies. My army was in part furnished by wild game; hunting parties fed the famished soldiers; by purchases from the Indians, I procured two days rations of beef. Information was received that the enemy was holding a war dance at the Hillabee towns, over a scalp taken at the battle of Talladega. Every bosom glowed with indignation. I detached General White to chastise them. What atonement can you make him and his brave companions for the injury you have done? You pretend the Hillabee clan had offered to submit on any terms General Jackson might dictate. From the attack by the East Tennessee troops they lost all confidence in our integrity and humanity. Shameful! Sir, it is too notorious that at the moment General White surprised and defeated them, a number of the warriors from these towns were actually in arms against the United States, and gave General Floyd battle the next day on the frontier of Georgia. You can plead the example of the Major General himself. When General Whites report of this brilliant achievement reached him; he endorsed on it that he had been informed by Ross, a Cherokee, that the enemy fired but one gun, and sent it to the Governor of Tennessee for publication. The General's chagrin can be more easily imagined than expressed. This was a glorious victory, crowned with complete success; 68 of the enemy's best troop's put to the sword, 29 more, one of whom was a principal chief, a prisoners of war, and 256 others led captive without the loss of one man on the part of the United States. It was planned and executed without his aid; it was too much for his noble soul to bear; a veil must be thrown over it; hence the story of unconditional submission."

When Sergeant Thorlton and the other troops returned to Fort Armstrong from the Hillabee towns, they were met with cries of well done from their comrades in arms, as reported in the journal of Captain Jacob Hartsell in command of a company of East Tennessee volunteers from Washington County, in Colonel Lillard Regiment;

"Monday, November 21, ................

I went to the general (Cocke) and asked him if I might take six or eight of my men and meet Captain McLing (Lillards Regiment) and the Carter County troops, (here he is referring to Captain Jesse Cole's company under the command of Colonel Samuel Wear ) and he granted me the request. Captain McLing's brother Captain Dick, and eight of my boys went armed in the best manner to meet them. When we came in forty paces Captain Dick and myself marched in front of the lines. We opened the lines half of the men on each side of the row and saluted them, when they had passed threw the lines commanded shoulder arms and went forth to see the men. They came running to meet on every side and shook hands, in the height of joy. Major Doran came up and a gladder man I never saw, he pulled his bottle and drank to me with much joy, and made me acquainted with a Captain out of the county, (referring to Colonel Wears, and Sergeant Thorlton's men ) Every man seemed to leap around me with joy and we sent in for the best music there was in the encampment . . . "

General Cocke then informed General Jackson of the victory at the Hillabee towns in the following correspondence;

"Fort Armstrong November 27, 1813

Dear General,

The detachment ordered under General White to the Hillabee's has returned. On the 18th they attacked the town at dawn killed 64 warriors & took 256 prisoners, 29 of whom are warriors, the residue women and children. The prisoners I have sent to Hiwassee Garrison. In this affair I did not lose one man either killed or wounded. I have one of the principal warriors among these prisoners by the name of Billy Scott. He was slightly wounded at Lashley Fort. I am as yet unprovided with provisions. I am building boats to transport supplies down river. Cattle are scarce among the Cherokees. I despair of getting a considerable number from them. I have men however in all directions in search of beef, they will return in eight or nine days, I shall then march to Fort Strother. Should you not hear from me again before the 6th of next month, you may rely on meeting me at the fort by the 12th with the force at least which you required. Should I be able to move sooner I will inform you by express.

I am most rest yrs

John Cocke
Major General

Most historians and writers of the era have written that General Jackson was greatly angered by this attack, and James Parton in his biography says that Jackson was filled with "grief and rage." This is not found however in his correspondence, and I think perhaps the indignation came later when Jackson realized it could be used to his political advantage. The following letter replying to the one from General Cocke above, was written on December 2, 1813 two-full weeks after General Jackson's reply to Grierson's peace proposal. Meaning that Jackson would have been fully aware, at this point in time, of any conflict that might have been caused by the Hillabee attack, and he wrote;

"Fort Strother, December 2, 1813

Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th giving an account of the success of the detachment under General White at the Hillabee's. This added to the affairs at Tallushatchee and Talladega will I think oblige the enemy to respect our arms. I am happy to learn that you will form a junction with me on the l2th I had previous to the receipt of your letter contemplated a movement on the 10th and had been making arrangements with the contractors for this purpose I hear nothing from McGhee, but the Governor continues to assure me that I am to receive ample supplies from him, and on that assurance I still rely not withstanding measures I have found it necessary to take to provide against disappointment. Calculating on your certain arrival on the 12th I shall spare no exertions in the meantime to be prepared for immediate operations thereafter . . . Yrs &c "

When Jackson wrote this letter he seemed almost willing to share the glory of the battles with the East Tennesseans, but this would soon change. At this time, Jackson was facing mutiny in his camp. His men, some having accompanied him on the Florida excursion of 1812, and having signed up for 12 months were now soon due for discharge, as were the 90 day volunteers which had mustered in Nashville. The one year troops, mustered as Federal militia for the recalled Florida Campaign, felt that the clock on their enlistment ran from the time of their original muster without interruption, while General Jackson felt that only the time of actual service could be considered. Hunger had been the constant companion, and the men felt they had been abandoned by the Government with little or no support. They had tasted battle, and were now doubtful of the prudence of continuing, and were longing for their farms and families.

For days they grumbled and feelings grew deeper and more determined. Officers and men were united in these feeling and with tempers flaring things came to a head on the night of the 9th of December. Throughout the camp the men met by the camp fires and talked of the wrongs done them by the contractors, and the longer they talked more convinced they became that the proper thing to do would be return home and continue the fight at a later more convenient date.

Jackson's problems were piling high on him, the glories of battle that he had hoped would salvage his reputation was in dire jeopardy of slipping through his fingers. With the troops threatening mutiny and returning home Jackson met them on the road, with a musket across his saddle and threatened to fire on the first man who continued on the road home. The men, who were on the whole, good men, relented and returned to camp, still grumbling. Jackson thought to hold the men without benefit of written contract of re-enlistment.

This feat of heroism credited to General Jackson, that of facing down his angry mutinous men alone with his rifle, may well have been more an act of desperation, to save the army he so badly needed to carry forward his plan.

On the 12th of December Sergeant John Thorlton and the other men of Cocke's Command arrived in Jackson's camp. Up to this time, General Cocke had not experienced the difficulty Jackson faced with his men. Cocke's men had been grumbling over the lack of food and supplies, but up to this point no mutiny had been considered or threatened. Cocke had requested of his men that they should stay in service throughout the present emergency. He wrote in his narrative;

"A short time after General White returned I received a letter from General Jackson, inviting me to join with my command upon the 12th of December, at Fort Strother, in which he stated, if I would do so, and bring with me all the provisions I could possibly raise, that in less than three weeks we could put and end to the Creek war. My men have been called into service for three months, and more than two thirds of their time had expired. I called my command together, read them General Jackson's letter, and appealed to their patriotism and love of country, and urged them to tender their services as long as it might be necessary to close the war. The whole of the army, with a few exceptions, agreed to do so. By the return of the Generals express I informed him of what I had done, and that it would afford me great pleasure to meet him with my command at the time and place indicated in his dispatch. I sent out agents to scour the Cherokee nation for supplies, and hauled over all the flour that could be procured on the Tennessee River. On the 12th of December, the day indicated, I reached General Jackson's encampment, with a noble army of more than two thousand men, with all supplies which could be procured: and, instead of finding an army, I found an almost deserted camp. It was then I learned for the first time of the difficulty between General Jackson and his army."

On the 12th of December after arriving in General Jackson's camp Captain Hartsell wrote in his journal;

"............I and Major Sevier talked about the battle that Jackson and his men fought. He told me that the men only drew one half ration of beef before they was marched onto the battle and fought the battle and marched back to this place, and never eat anything but the half ration of beef till they was here two days. They marched on towards Dittos Landing and met the provisions coming. And they turned and eat raw hides and slunk calves and the guts and tripes of the beef were issued out to the men . . . he told me that he saw some of the men hunt corn that was trod in the dung and parch it and eat it . . . there was more confusion than I ever saw in my life in this place. There could hardly be anything done for cursing and swearing amongst the men."

The next entry of the, 13th Captain Hartsell continued;

"..........Jackson called on them three months for to fight the Indians, and they would not stay any longer on account of their bad usage and it much affronted General Jackson and I heard him swear that he would write to the government to send them on to the Natchey country to serve the balance of the time . . . we East Tennessee Volunteers air much displeased at their usage at this place we would be very glad to march on to the Hickory ground, as soon as possible . . . "

Now, with almost no West Tennessee troops, and only those from East Tennessee to command Jackson was faced with a dilemma. Should he now carry the fight on south and share the glory with East Tennessee with no sizeable force from West Tennessee to gather the laurels of battle? General Thomas Pinckney had been placed in command of all the troops in the Creek War. The East Tennesseans according to General Cocke's statement were willing to continue, so what happened? I believe that Jackson took a calculated risk that Governor Blount would in fact furnish him with fresh troops from West Tennessee as he had promised so he gambled for after all gambling was one of his professions. He totally dismissed the East Tennessee Troops and sent them home, along with General Cocke. And during this time decided to use the Hillabee's incident to discredit whatever glory was coming to the East Tennesseans, and finally to complete the discrediting shortly after General Cocke returned with fresh troops he was arrested on trumped up charges and court marshaled. This left Jackson the opportunity to accomplish what he was after from the beginning, the rebuilding of his shattered reputation.

General Cocke continued his narrative;

"On the second day after I reached General Jackson's encampment against the earnest remonstrances and protestations of myself and army, he discharged all the men under my command except Colonel Lillards regiment, took all supplies, and ordered me repair to my division and raise two thousand men for six months service. "

Again referring to Eaton's biography, General Cocke's answered;

".........And yet the reverend sir says that I seemed resolved to refuse him aid, lest he might eclipse me in the campaign! Let an impartial public determine from the truth of history whether or not I could have had any such apprehensions. A little calm reflection might, it seems, have convinced Mr. Eaton that there was but little prospect of being eclipsed by a general who was in so deplorable a situation as I found General Jackson at Fort Strother."

The politics and high ranking jockeying for position had very little to do with Sergeant John Thorlton. The call had come for his services as a citizen, without any consideration, or hesitation to the contrary he immediately left to serve his country. He did all that was asked of him and performed, as General Cocke reported, with honor. With his three-month enlistment up, and the army being dismissed by General Jackson, John Thorlton returned to his family and farm on the banks of Hickory Creek. John Thorlton was mustered out on January 1, 1814, and he returned home with 36 U.S. Dollars in his buckskins.

While John was returning to his civilian life General Jackson, now with fresh troops, was marching on Horseshoe Bend in the Mississippi Territory, where on March 27, 1814 they engaged in the Battle of Tohopeka, or Horseshoe Bend. He crushed the Creeks, and this was the battle which would help propel Andrew Jackson, William Carroll, John Williams, and Sam Houston to the hero status which led to their success in politics.

After returning to General Jackson's army, General Cocke was returned to Nashville for trial. There he was acquitted, and on this subject General Cocke wrote;

"........I was arrested when almost in sight of the enemies country, my sword taken from me, and I was sent to Nashville for trial! A court martial, composed of my bitterest enemies and General Jackson's most devoted personal friends, was called to sit upon my trial. Specifications and charges involving my whole conduct as and officer during the entire term I was in the service were filed against me. I was tried; all the testimony which I could operate to my prejudice was heard, and after a most through investigation, I was not only acquitted of every charge and specification, but unanimously acquitted with honor, and that to by a court composed of my most bitter enemies. In the meantime the campaign had closed, and I was in the way of no man's ambition; and of course could not expect to eclipse General Jackson in that campaign . . . By the next campaign troops were collected that were more submissive and General Coffee resumed his command. I believe, sir, he will not thank you for magnifying his services at the Horse Shoe. He has more virtue, more modesty than to pretend he rendered eminent services there. His situation precluded him; he was posted on the opposite side of the river and prohibited from crossing . . .

I pardon your errors. The General's appointment might not be recognized, as it was unauthorized by law. Why not give the Cherokee Indians the praise, they deserve. Did they not render eminent service, contrary to general orders, and were instrumental in a pre-eminent degree, in reducing the fortification?

I suppose you concluded it would be well to keep them and the order to Captain Phagan to charge the breast works with his company and stop the port-holes out of view, as this order was a little un-military and displayed no great talents in those you are determined to puff . . . "

It is necessary to interrupt General Cocke's letter to elaborate on the incident just mentioned. When it became apparent that the state of Tennessee was in need of the services of its young men to defend their neighbors to the south, a young mixed breed Cherokee named John Ross, part Scotch-Irish part Cherokee, promptly enlisted a regiment of Cherokees to assist the Tennessee Troops.

After moving south with the other Tennesseans, John Ross and his Cherokee's marched with Andrew Jackson to the "Battle of Horse-Bend." Here on the Tallapoosa River, the Creeks had thrown up strong fortifications of logs across the neck of the peninsula made by the bend of the river. Here a thousand Creek warriors, along with three hundred women and children had taken refuge. On the banks of the river behind them the Creeks had moored their canoes safely tied for use in case an escape became necessary. When it was found that Jackson's artillery was making no progress against the breastworks, John Ross and his Cherokee's crossed the river untied the Creeks canoe's, and with the captured canoes, crossed the river and attacked the Creeks rear. This action diverted the Creeks attention from the defense of Jackson in the front, and while they were busy fighting John Ross and his Cherokees, Jackson was able to storm the Creek's front. The Creeks fought bravely and were cut down without mercy. In a strange vocal equation of history, whenever the Indian won a battle it was a massacre, and when the whiteman was successful in was a victory. In this whiteman's victory, General Andrew Jackson was no more merciful at Horseshoe Bend than John Weathersford had been at Fort Mims. Of the nearly 1,400 Creeks present when the battle begun only three hundred survived. General Jackson's "victory" at Horseshoe Bend would probably have ended in a similar manner as his earlier exploit, when his men mutinied back in December, had it not been for John Ross and his Cherokee's. From this victory Jackson achieved the lime light he so badly needed, went on to the Battle of New Orleans, where he was again saved from disaster by a privateer named Jean Lafitte, and to the presidency of the United States.

John Ross became one of his people's greatest leaders, and the two, Jackson and Ross, would meet again when Jackson was able to thank the Cherokees for their pratrotisim and loyality by stealing their land and removing them to Oklahoma territory.

General Cocke's letter now continues;